Framework - AFC

A: Interpretation - The negative must not contest the affirmative’s ethical standard, read an alternative framework, and or contest AFC, provided that the AC standard is act utilitarianism, it’s disclosed on the NDCA wiki that the aff could read AFC with this specific standard, and the round is during the tournament of champions.

B: Violation - This shell is pre-emptive. My opponent violates if they contest or recontextualize the aff framework, read an NC, or contest AFC with a counter interp or theory argument that uses AFC as the violation.

C: Standards

1. Clash – AFC forces substantive engagement, especially since util does not exclude impacts and necessitates advocacy comparison. AFC additionally forces meaningful rebuttal clash since all substance arguments are on one layer. The disclosure and TOC planks of my interp guarantee no prep skew or predictability loss. Clash has strongest link into unique and transferable education. Without it the vast majority of the debate is scripted and skewed towards topic-independent meta-debates. Clash is key to fairness because it insures reciprocal engagement on issues, and asymmetrical offensive opportunities produce an unreciprocal chance of winning.

And topical clash outweighs philosophical clash (a) this topic revolves around applied ethics and is portable to imminent out of round decisions – like how we ought to address poverty, (b) philosophical frameworks can be learned during explicitly phil topics or contexts such as school and camp, whereas this is our last chance to engage on the topic.

1. Strategy skew – the aff speaks in the dark whereas the negative is adaptive. The AC is on one layer, but the negative has access to moral frameworks, procedurals, and discursive arguments that each function as independent outs. AFC levels the playing field by forcing the neg to commit to the aff on substance, which ensures the AC matters. Strat skew controls the internal link to education because it ensures I have access to layers of the flow and prevents clash avoidance. Preventing strat skew is key to fairness because debaters must be able to leverage offense to access the ballot.

D. Voter – Fairness is a voter because it’s constitutive of debate, the ballot asks you to vote for the better debater not better cheater

Phil ed is good but framework debate harms it for multiple reasons:

1. Low quality arguments and misconceptions plague phil discussion. Nebel[[1]](#footnote-1) et Al 13

Some features of LD debate, as it is practiced today, encourage students to misrepresent philosophical arguments, ignore subtle distinctions, and oversimplify ideas. Here is one reason why. Debaters have limited speech time, so one reliable way to win is by overwhelming one’s opponent with objections. Instead of developing the best version of the best objection to each argument, debaters often make as many objections as they can think of, regardless of their quality. Why? Because a false argument is strategic so long as the explanation of its falsity is more time intensive than the argument itself. Students know that this strategy is successful, so they try to replicate it by learning how to generate large numbers of objections. Unfortunately, learning how to make more objections usually trades off with learning how to make better objections. (Perhaps it need not be this way, but that is the status quo.) So, many debaters, including the most successful ones, learn not to care about the quality of an argument. They internalize the view that any argument is worth making as long as it maximizes the debater’s time tradeoff—that is, the ratio of how long her opponent spends answering her objection compared to how long the objection took to develop. Sometimes, explaining an argument in the kind of depth and precision that philosophers use has little marginal value in terms of the debater’s time tradeoff. As long as she can get the basic argument out there, she can force her opponent to waste her time answering it. If the answers are poor, then all the better. If the answers are good, the debater will just dig in on a different argument, and it will not matter. Of course, some debates involve well developed arguments with thoughtful objections and an interesting dialectic that often mirrors current academic debates on the issue. But these are extremely rare because it is often easier and more efficient to oversimplify. Furthermore, the misunderstanding and oversimplification of some of the philosophical literature used in LD debate is a persistent problem. In our experience, the vast majority of students and instructors in LD debate use the word “utilitarianism” to describe any moral principle according to which the consequences of an act are relevant. This is a mistake because [but] there are many non-utilitarian version[s] of consequentialism, and because many non-consequentialists agree that consequences matter (they just aren’t all that matters). Is this too much nuance to expect from high school students? Maybe, but we think it would be better if debaters used no technical terms rather than incorrect ones. Misusing terms leads students to misinterpret what they read and, therefore, misunderstand the philosophy. Moreover, misusing terms may lead students to develop false beliefs about the philosophical terrain. Students who use “utilitarianism” incorrectly may end up believing that the only plausible view on which consequences matter is the theory that requires us to maximize total well-being. These students will believe in false dilemmas.

1. Debate teaches equivocation and structural issues such as speed prevent education. Nebel[[2]](#footnote-2) et Al 13

A more pernicious worry is that sometimes LD debaters will go as far as to intentionally misrepresent or distort arguments found in the philosophical literature. Debaters may read excerpts from various philosophers discussing the relationship between reason and moral responsibility while glossing over the subtleties of each thinker’s views, if not outright equivocating between fundamentally distinct uses of the relevant terminology. Members of the community are often complacent in regards to these practices. To see how widely our impressions held, we conducted a survey of 245 debaters, coaches, and judges. The respondents were readers of a debate blog—mostly current debaters, but nearly 80 coaches and 20 former debaters. 74 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement: “Many arguments that succeed in LD are too poorly explained or read **too** fast to be adequately understood and answered” (see Figure 1). Similarly, 62 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that “debaters often misrepresent their evidence” (see Figure 2)

The value is morality and criterion **act utilitarianism.** Under the framework we act to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. A recontextualization of the framework would appeal to other ethical theories to weigh offense or argue for a different version of util.

My advocacy text is that all just governments require employers to pay a living wage. Just governments refer to municipalities and cities in the context of the resolution, and the relevant employers are city contractors and firms receiving funding from cities. **Neumark and Adams**[[3]](#footnote-3) **03** clarify

Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

# Framework - Util

All bracketed cards are for efficiency and grammar.

I value governmental obligations.

Protection of society as a whole is the government’s primary obligation. Kennan[[4]](#footnote-4): bracketed

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of **governments** are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent not a principal. Its **primary obligation is to the interests of** the national **society** it represents, **not** to the moral impulses that **individual [moral impulses]** elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-á-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-á-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents. Let me explain. **The interests** of the national society for which government has to concern itself **are** basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the **wellbeing** of its people.These needs have no moral quality. **They arise from the very existence of the** national **state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys.** They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence of the national and therefore not subject to classification as either “good” or “bad.”They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such [philosophical] judgments. **When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured**, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity, and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence put it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

Further, policy-making must be consequentialist since collective action results in conflicts that only util can resolve. Reject deontic or freedom based side constraints since they paralyze state action – it's impossible to compare tradeoffs involving opportunity costs. States also lack intentionality or internal motivation since they're composed of multiple individuals necessary to pass policies – so, they must be justifiable to the public as a whole.

Thus the value criterion is **Act Utilitarianism**. In addition to the above syllogism, prefer the standard because:

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# Framework – Structural Violence

Ethical theories should build on revulsion to atrocities. **Glover[[6]](#footnote-6) 2000:**

With disasters on the scale of some in the twentieth century, any ethical theory, which either justifies them or can give no help in avoiding them is inadequate. The thought at Auschwitz and other places, ‘never again’, is more compelling that any abstract ethical principle (There is a parallel with a though sometimes expressed about another part of philosophy: belief in the existence of the physical world is more compelling than belief in any philosophical theory which purports to disprove it). If persuaded that an otherwise convincing ethical theory could justify the Nazi genocide, I should without hesitation give up the theory. **In reconstructing ethics, revulsion** against these things which people have done **has a central place**. It is necessary to see the size and urgency of the problem. For those of us whose everyday life is in relatively calm and sheltered places, the horrors of Rwanda or Bosnia or Kosovo seem unreal. The atrocities can be put out of mind. The television news reports torture or a massacre and we feel relief when it moves onto political scandals or sports. We bystanders look away. **Repressing each atrocity maintains the illusion that the world is fundamentally a tolerable place.** Yet it is almost certain that, as you read this sentence, in some places people are being killed and in others people are being tortured

Structural violence is the most important impact – the marginalized are too often ignored in everyday decision-making, exacerbating their exclusion. **Winter and Leighton 99[[7]](#footnote-7)**

Direct violence is horrific, but its brutality usually gets our attention: we notice it, and∂ often respond to it. **Structural violence**, however, **is** almost always invisible, embedded into ubiquitous social structures, **normalized** by stable institutions **and regular** experience.∂ Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal,∂ economic, or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, structural inequities∂ usually seem ordinary—the way things are and always have been. But structural violence∂ produces suffering and death as often as direct violence does, though the damage is∂ slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair. The chapters in this∂ section teach us about some important but invisible forms of structural violence, and alert∂ us to the powerful cultural mechanisms that create and maintain them over generations.∂ Johan Galtung originally framed the term “structural violence” to mean any constraint∂ on human potential caused by economic and political structures (1969). Unequal access∂ to resources, to political power, to education, to health care, or to legal standing, are  forms of structural violence. When inner-city children have inadequate schools while∂ others do not, when gays and lesbians are fired for their sexual orientation, when laborers∂ toil in inhumane conditions, when people of color endure environmental toxins in their∂ neighborhoods, structural violence exists. Unfortunately, even those who are victims of∂ structural violence often do not see the systematic ways in which their plight is∂ choreographed by unequal and unfair distribution of society’s resources. Such is the∂ insidiousness of structural violence.∂ **Structural violence is** problematic in and of itself, but it is **also dangerous because it**∂ **frequently leads to direct violence**. **The chronically oppressed are often**, for logical∂ reasons, **those who resort to direct violence**. **Organized armed conflict** **in** various parts **of**∂ **the world is easily traced to structured inequalities.** Northern Ireland, for example, has∂ been marked by economic disparities between Northern Irish Catholics—who have∂ higher unemployment rates and less formal education—and Protestants (Cairns and Darby,∂ 1998). In Sri Lanka, youth unemployment and underemployment exacerbates ethnic∂ conflict (Rogers, Spencer, and Uyangoda, 1998). In Rwanda, huge disparities in both∂ income and social status between the Hutu and Tutsis eventually led to ethnic massacres.∂ While structural violence often leads to direct violence, the reverse is also true, as∂ brutality terrorizes bystanders, who then become unwilling or unable to confront social∂ injustice. Increasingly, civilians pay enormous costs of war, not only through death, but∂ through devastation of neighborhoods and ecosystems. Ruling elites rarely suffer from∂ armed conflict as much as civilian populations do, who endure decades of poverty and∂ disease in war-torn societies.ecognizing the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how∂ and why we tolerate it, questions that often have painful answers. The first chapter in this∂ section, “Social Injustice,” by Susan Opotow, argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive∂ processes lead us to care about people inside our scope of justice, but rarely care about∂ those people outside. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to∂ someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are∂ invisible or irrelevant to us. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts∂ to everyone; moral exclusion is a product of our normal cognitive processes. But Opotow∂ argues convincingly that we can reduce its nefarious effects by becoming aware of our∂ distorted perceptions. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships,∂ communication, and appreciation of diversity.∂ One outcome of exclusionary thinking is the belief that victims of violence must in∂ some way deserve their plight. But certainly it is easy to see that young children do not∂ deserve to be victims. The next two chapters in this section address the violence∂ experienced by children. In the first, “The War Close to Home: Children and Violence in∂ the United States,” Kathleen Kostelny and James Garbarino describe the direct and∂ structural violence which children in Chicago and other urban areas of the United States∂ endure, paralleling that experienced by children who live in countries at war. Children∂ who endure these environments often become battle weary, numb, hopeless, and/or∂ morally impaired. But children not only suffer directly from violence, they also suffer∂ from the impaired parenting and communities which poverty inflicts. The authors∂ describe how community and family support mechanisms can mitigate these effects. For  xample, home visitation and early childhood education programs provide crucial family∂ and community support.∂ While Kostelny and Garbarino focus on community intervention techniques, Milton∂ Schwebel and Daniel Christie, in their article “Children and Structural Violence,” extend∂ the analysis of structural violence by examining how economic and psychological∂ deprivation impairs at-risk children. Children living in poverty experience diminished∂ intellectual development because parents are too overwhelmed to be able to provide∂ crucial linguistic experiences. Schwebel and Christie’s discussion concludes that∂ economic structures must provide parents with living-wage employment, good prenatal∂ medical care, and high-quality child-care if we are to see the next generation develop into∂ the intelligent and caring citizens needed to create a peaceful world.∂ If children are the invisible victims of society’s structural violence, so are their∂ mothers. In the chapter “Women, Girls, and Structural Violence: A Global Analysis,”∂ Diane Mazurana and Susan McKay articulate the many ways in which global sexism∂ systematically denies females access to resources. From health care and food to legal∂ standing and political power, women and girls get less than males in every country on the∂ planet. Mazurana and McKay argue that patriarchy-based structural violence will not be∂ redressed until women are able to play more active roles making decisions about how∂ resources are distributed.∂ Patriarchal values also drive excessive militarism, as Deborah Winter, Marc Pilisuk,∂ Sara Houck, and Matthew Lee argue in their chapter “Understanding Militarism: Money,∂ Masculinism, and the Search for the Mystical.” The authors illuminate three motives  ueling excessive military expenditures: money, which, because of modern market forces,∂ leads half the world’s countries to spend more on arms than on health and education∂ combined; masculinism, which leads societies to make soldiering a male rite of passage∂ and proof of manhood; and the search for the mystical, as men attempt to experience∂ profound human processes of selfsacrifice, honor, and transcendence through war. Like∂ William James, these authors argue that we will need to find a moral equivalent to war, in∂ order to build lasting peace.

The standard is preventing **structural violence**.

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Contention

Contention 1 is poverty

Poverty is on the rise despite job growth. Income inequality and low pay are the root causes**. Fletcher[[9]](#footnote-9) 13**

Nearly a third of the nation’s working families earn salaries so low that they struggle to pay for their necessities, according to a new report. The ranks of the so-called working poor have grown even as the nation has created new jobs for 27 consecutive months and is showing other signs of shaking off the worst effects of the recession. “Although many people are returning to work, they are often taking jobs with lower wages and less job security, compared with the middle class jobs they held before the downturn,” according to a report released Tuesday by the Working Poor Families Project, a national initiative aimed at fostering state policies to help low-income working families. With the nation’s economy in recovery, the report said, more than 70 percent of low-income families and half of all poor families were working by 2011. The problem is they did not earn enough to cover their basic living expenses. “We’re not on a good trajectory,” said Brandon Roberts, who manages the Working Poor Families Project. “The overall number of low-income working families is increasing despite the recovery.” Analyzing 2011 data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, the report said that 32 percent of working families earned salaries that put them below double the poverty threshold. For a family of four, double the poverty threshold was $45,622. That percentage has crept up from 28 percent in 2007, the year the recession began. And 37 percent of the nation’s children — 23.5 million — were part of working poor families in 2011, the report said, up from 33 percent in 2007. Nearly three in five low-income working families were headed by at least one minority parent, even though minorities headed 42 percent of all working families. The growth in the ranks of the working poor coincides with continued growth in income inequality. Many of the occupations experiencing the fastest job growth during the recovery also pay poorly. Among them are retail jobs, food preparation, clerical work and customer assistance. At the same time, researchers have found that many jobs that do not require much in the way of educational credentials but pay relatively well have lagged in the recovery. They include carpenters, painters, real estate brokers and insurance professionals. Jobs typically filled by college graduates fared better than others during the downturn, helping to widen the gap between those at the top of the wage scale and those at the bottom. In 2011, the top fifth of working families had incomes that were 10.1 times greater than those in the bottom fifth of income earners. In 2007, the top fifth of working families earned 9.5 times those in the lowest fifth. Meanwhile, the best means for climbing the income ladder — improved education — is growing more uncertain and more expensive, the report said. Also, the federal government is facing huge budget deficits, meaning that policies that would help bolster working poor families, such as a higher minimum wage, are unlikely to be implemented. Still, Roberts said, “we have to be more aggressive” with policy. “We’re not talking about all families. We’re talking about families

And low pay work can’t raise people out of poverty – wage increases are necessary solve poverty and inequality in the status quo. **Page[[10]](#footnote-10) 14**

Wage adequacy: Even if a low-skill job is acquired, it won’t be poverty-reducing unless it delivers enough in the way of wages (or transfers) to push the recipient over the poverty threshold.4 Over the last 40 years, the wages of low-skill jobs have been stagnant for a number of reasons, including, for example, the declining real value of the minimum wage. Between 1975 and 1995, the 20th percentile of the weekly wage distribution declined from $473 to $386, resulting in fewer jobs that provided an above-poverty wage. Recent studies have shown that a $100 reduction in the real weekly wage among workers in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution reduces the annual probability of escaping poverty by about 15 percent.5 The declining payoff to work could also reduce the incentive to work at all, which may in turn lead to a deterioration of skills, further reducing the likelihood of escaping poverty

The living wage directly reduces poverty. **Clain[[11]](#footnote-11) 08**

The empirical results of the estimation of Eqs. 1a and 1b are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.21 Most variables have the expected signs and the desired significance, but there are exceptions. The most noteworthy results concern how state and local wage policies affect poverty rates. In particular, the variable reflecting the presence of local living wage legislation has a significant negative impact on the poverty rate.22,23 This result supports the findings of Neumark and Adams (2003a) and Adams and Neumark (2005a).24 By contrast, the presence of a state minimum wage law has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the poverty rate. Here, as found elsewhere, there is “no compelling evidence supporting the view that minimum wages help in the fight against poverty” (Neumark and Wascher 2002: 333).

And no harm to employment – the best empirics show slight employment gains. **Lester and Jacobs[[12]](#footnote-12) 10:**

The study examines how living wage standards affect 14 distinct employment variables: total citywide; broad low-wage services; narrow low-wage services; retail; restaurants; hotels; manufacturing; nondurable manufacturing; back-office; wholesale; big-box retail; finance insurance and real estate; headquarters; and branch plants. Together these provide a comprehensive examination of the potential combined direct, direct spillover, and indirect effects that business assistance living wage laws can have on local employment. Figure 1 presents these 14 variables as the possible range of employment change expected after passage, allowing up to two years for lagged effects. None of the 14 outcome variables show a statistically significant negative consequence of passing a business assistance living wage standard. Statistically significant outcomes would mean that we are 90 percent confident that the estimate is different from zero. But this is not the case for any of the variables, which means we can conclude that there is no employment effect. (More detailed results are presented in the technical appendix.)41 Our estimates indicate that passage of a business assistance living wage law has no measurable effect on citywide employment. Employment levels are unaffected in low-wage industries as is employment in industries likely to be targets of economic development subsidies and in firms that are sensitive to the perceived business climate of a city. This suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have direct, direct spillover, or indirect effects on employment levels. These findings discredit the primary arguments used by opponents of business assistance living wage laws that these laws are harmful to employment in direct and indirect ways. It is important to note that the results are based on nearly 20 years of data—a timeframe that contained years of recessions and expansions—which suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have an effect on employment levels even during hard economic times. Main findings Main findings | www.americanprogressaction.org 25 These results are also quite robust. For example, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular city from the treatment group has no meaningful effect on the results. Figure 1 visually represents the 90 percent confidence interval of our point estimates. Any number line in Figure 1 that includes zero in the shaded area indicates that the estimated effect is not different than zero. This means that there is no estimated employment effect, which is the case for all the variables tested. The estimated impact of employment in low-wage industries—the sectors where we can expect the living wage to have the largest bite—bears some additional discussion. Our estimates for the five low-wage sectors we measure are all nearly zero, or slightly positive. These results strongly contrast with the findings of Adams and Neumark, who find significant negative employment effects for low-wage workers overall. For retail and restaurants our estimates are precise enough to reject the point estimates of their study.42

Prefer this evidence over neg employment empirics – they don’t account for urban impacts and enforcement. **Lester and Jacobs 2**:

Yet experts have questioned this past research on the grounds that the data sources could not detect urban level impacts and that they did not adequately control for whether cities actually enforce their business assistance provisions. This study uses a more robust dataset than the previous research and includes background archival research into each treatment city’s law, and we find no evidence of negative employment effects from business assistance living wage laws. Our research design is conceptually identical to that of Adams and Neumark, yet we can rule out negative consequences of the scope they report.

Enforcement comes first for evidence comparison because their studies can’t evaluate the living wage if they don’t look at the relative stringency of its implementation.

And the net effect of the living wage is reduction in poverty – prefer my evidence because it accounts for a risk of unemployment. **CRA[[13]](#footnote-13) 11**, brackets for clarity

[living wages] Reduce the fraction of households below the federal poverty line by between 2.4 and 4.1 percentage points, or between 0.9 and 1.6 percentage points based on a 38% increase above the minimum wage. The empirical evidence shows that the estimated size of the change varies across samples and time periods and in some cases it is not statistically different from zero. Some of the workers receiving wage gains are in households that were below the Federal poverty line before the enactment of the mandates and above the poverty line after the enactment of the mandates. Our interpretation for the reduction in poverty is that some households may have moved from just below the poverty line to just above the poverty line. While some households found themselves above the poverty line, other households may have moved to just below the poverty line or moved into further poverty due to lower employment [resulted] resulting from the enactment of the wage mandates. But the net effect may suggest reductions in poverty

Prefer this evidence on the poverty debate because the article does an extensive literature review to ensure accuracy on the effects of living wages.

And poverty kills millions and leads to structural violence, Abu-Jamal**[[14]](#footnote-14)**:

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --Ghandi It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

Contention 2 is worker turnover

Literature consensus proves that living wages reduce turnover, and cause boosts in productivity. **Thompson and Chapman[[15]](#footnote-15) 06**

One potential benefit of living wage ordinances (which is also one explanation for the minor impact on municipal budgets and employment levels) is that higher wage floors lead to decreased turnover and greater work effort among the affected workforce, as well as spur firms to seek out and adopt other means of boosting productivity. These responses could offset at least some of the increased labor costs experienced by employers. Most of the available research on living wages suggests that these types of responses are occurring. 15 Increased productivity resulting from wage increases has been recognized for decades, particularly in the economics literature on “efficiency wages” and debates over the minimum wage. With higher wages, workers may feel greater satisfaction with their job and may decide to put in greater work effort.27 Increased effort could also result from fear of losing the job; now that the job is more desirable than available alternatives the “cost of job loss” is greater. A related byproduct is that workers may be less likely to leave their jobs, thus lowering the rate of employee turnover and reducing costs of recruiting and training new workers. All of these mechanisms suggest ways that increased labor costs for firms are offset. The research on the living wage has provided new opportunities to test for evidence of these effects. The earliest living wage studies relied on qualitative interviews, and presented evidence to suggest that employees were working harder with the new wage floor and turnover had declined. In their survey of affected workers, Niedt found that most reported an improved attitude toward their job, including a greater sense of worth of the job and an intention to stay on the job longer (Niedt 1999, 2). Similarly, in their interviews with effected contractors, researchers at Preamble found evidence suggesting improved attitudes toward work as well as reduced turnover (Preamble 1996, 13). The Preamble study quotes one manager as saying “workers seem happy [and] they come to work on time because they know that at $6.10 [in 1995] per hour, somebody else wants the job if they don’t.” Further anecdotal evidence of decreased turnover following living wage ordinances is reported in Elmore’s survey of cities. Sander and Lokey’s interviews with contractors following implementation of the living wage ordinance in Los Angeles also yielded evidence that some firms had responded to increased labor costs by becoming more productive. At SFO, Reich found evidence that the living wage led to increased productivity, reduced turnover, and shorter airport lines. There were 1,550 fewer turnovers per year at SFO following implementation of the QSP (Reich 2003, 55). Security screeners, who had a notoriously high turnover rate of 94.7% before the living wage, had just [and] an 18.7% turnover rate after the living wage, where the average wage of security screeners went from $6.45 an hour to $10.00 an hour. Annual turnover among firms experiencing “high impacts” from the QSP fell from 49% to 20%, while turnover at “low impact” firms fell from 17% to 14% (Reich 2003, 52).28 In addition, employers reported a range of other positive outcomes following the implementation of the QSP: 35% reported improvement in work performance, 47% reported better employee morale, 44% reported fewer disciplinary issues, and 45% reported improved customer service.29 David Fairris’ study of Los Angeles found that employers in that city also reaped some benefits from the living wage. While employee turnover decreased for the entire sample of firms, it appears that firms affected by the living wage experienced larger decreases than firms that were not affected. Differences in the questionnaires for the two types of firms complicate the analysis, but Fairris reported significantly lower levels of turnover at affected firms. Controlling for other factors, Fairris showed one-third less turnover among low-wage workers in firms affected by the living wage ordinance (Fairris 2005, 101). This conclusion holds when looking at the entire firm and focusing exclusively on turnover among the lowest-paid workers. Based on his regression analysis, Fairris concludes, “The lower turnover rate 16 for prominent low-wage occupations in living wage establishments is entirely accounted for by the higher wage that prevails there.” Additionally, absenteeism declined more at low-wage firms affected by the ordinance than at low-wage firms not impacted by the ordinance. The detailed interviews with firms affected by Los Angeles’s living wage ordinance buttress the statistical results. The LAANE study quotes one employer as stating, “Higher wages mean less turnover” (Fairria et al. 2005). One in-depth analysis of living wage ordinances’ impact on turnover was conducted by Candace Howes, an economist at Connecticut College. Howes studied the impact of a series of living wage policies, which nearly doubled the hourly wages of homecare workers in San Francisco, and provided them with health insurance. Using a unique database linking payroll records with case management files, Howes found that homecare worker turnover fell by 57% following the implementation of the living wage policies30 (Howes 2005, 140). The likelihood that a new worker would stay at least one year on the job rose by 89%, after controlling for the effects of general economic growth. Most studies looking at the topic of turnover, absenteeism, and employee work effort have found some evidence supporting the beneficial impacts of living wages. One study reporting mixed findings is Brenner’s analysis of Boston. Although one quarter of firms reported greater employee work effort and one quarter similarly reported improved morale, there was no evidence that higher wages produced lower turnover or less absenteeism (Brenner 2005, 73-77).

And low turnover is key to firm productivity and growth – it makes profits four times greater. **Holtom[[16]](#footnote-16) 12:**

We proposed and tested an integrated model of unit-level attrition, customer-related outcomes, and profit within the context of a relationship-based service business. Using time-lagged data, we demonstrated the negative effect voluntary turnover has on CESD [customer evaluation of service delivery] and their subsequent impact on [service brand image] SBI. Downsizing was shown to have a negative impact on customer orientation, which also influences SBI. We did not find a negative relationship between downsizing and CESD. Finally, we observed a strong relationship between service-brand image and profits. In short, the data confirm that high levels of attrition—whether through downsizing or voluntary turnover—have a negative impact on customers’ image of the service brand, which predict subsequent declines in unit profitability. Theoretical Implications The results of our analyses suggest that employee attrition has significant negative effects on the performance of business units. In addition, by demonstrating that CESD fully mediates the relationship between voluntary turnover and SBI and that customer orientation fully mediates the relationship between downsizing and SBI, we have taken an initial step in clarifying the contents of the ‘‘black box’’ between turnover and its performance-related consequences (Hausknecht and Trevor 2011; Holtom et al. 2008). These findings and the underlying theoretical mechanisms are likely to extend to contexts where customers interact with the same employee more than once, and where an understanding of a customer’s idiosyncratic needs is critical in order to provide high service levels. These contexts include many personal service settings (e.g., financial services, health care, child care) as well business-to-business relationships (e.g., industrial suppliers, professional service firms). Additionally, as Hausknecht and Trevor (2011, p. 355) noted, ‘‘involuntary turnover dynamics are not well understood.’’ This fact coupled with the pervasiveness of reductions in force or downsizing in the United States (U.S. Department of Labor 2010) point to the importance of these empirical results. Not only is the financial impact made clear but also insights into the process by which it occurs are illuminated. Contrary to our prediction and the findings of McElroy and associates (2001), downsizing was not found to negatively influence CESD. While the reason for this finding is not completely clear, it is possible that the downsizing units in our sample were able to prevent short-term disruption to their operations by a more efficient use of their remaining employees. However, it should be noted that downsizing did have a significant negative influence on employees’ customer orientation levels, which is likely to translate into lower CESD levels in the long term. Implications for Practice The organizational behavior literature is rich with theory and associated practical recommendations for organizations desiring to reduce voluntary turnover. For many years, researchers have advocated increasing JS (Hackman and Oldham 1978) or organizational commitment (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982) as methods for stemming turnover. More recently, perceived organizational support (Eisenberger et al. 1986) and job embeddedness (Mitchell et al. 2001) have gained traction as theories with strong empirical support and rich recommendations for combating high levels of voluntary turnover. For example, in addition to looking at the fit an employee has with the organization, the links he or she has developed with people inside the organization and the sacrifices that would be incurred if he or she were to leave, job embeddedness looks at a person’s fit with, links in and benefits associated with the community where he or she lives (Mitchell et al. 2001). This gives the manager multiple ports for influencing employee connections to the job and surrounding area, thereby increasing the probability of staying. Though relatively less is known about the effects of downsizing, both the decision and the process by which it occurs are controlled directly by managers. Thus, the primary practical implication of this work as it relates to downsizing is to be cognizant of its potential impact. Similar to the delay in observing the positive effect from marketing actions or service enhancements designed to improve satisfaction (van Doorn 2008), the negative effects of downsizing are most likely to be delayed. Thus, while there are obvious financial savings from planned attrition, there may be material long-term financial implications from downsizing that managers may not predict. However, these hidden costs from downsizing and turnover may be significant and therefore important for managers to anticipate. There are a number of ways that these effects might be mitigated by addressing the mediators of the relationship with SBI directly. Specifically, the leader of a unit experiencing high rates of voluntary turnover would be well advised to reemphasize to remaining employees the importance of communicating effectively with clients to provide personalized service in order to maintain positive CESD. Similarly, knowing that downsizing affects perceptions of customer orientation, organizations that opt to downsize can try to reduce this impact by developing specific training for remaining employees that emphasizes listening to clients, partnering with them to develop effective responses in a timely manner, and ensuring that a consistent understanding of what constitutes positive service delivery exists. Our results also highlight the importance of emphasizing customer orientation among employees. High levels of customer orientation can be obtained by selection customerfocused employees, training them in customer-related attitudes and skills, and rewarding them for customer-oriented behaviors like responsiveness, helpfulness, and relationship building (Schneider and Bowen 1995). Further, notwithstanding evidence that time-lagged relationships reported are generally weaker than concurrent relationships, we found strong support for the mediating role of CESD in creating positive SBI and profits. Because this variable was measured using data directly from customers, we believe that the role employee continuity plays in maintaining functional relationships between the organization and its customers cannot be ignored. While the direct costs of voluntary turnover are well known (e.g., recruitment, testing, selection, training), this research adds insight into the indirect costs of attrition on profitability. In order to demonstrate the practical implications of this study, we estimated the differences in CESD and customer orientation rates for high and low attrition units as well as the profitability of units with high and low SBIs. We found that units that had high levels of voluntary turnover (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or above 42%) had an average CESD score of 3.94, while those with low voluntary turnover rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or below 20%) had an average CESD score of 4.19—a significant quarter scale point difference. Similarly, units that engaged in high levels of downsizing (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; downsizing rates at or above 19%) had an average customer orientation score of 3.93, while the units with low downsizing rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; downsizing rates at or below 8%) had an average customer orientation score of 4.38—a significant difference of almost a half scale point. More interestingly, units with lower levels of SBI (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; values of 4.12 and below) had unit profits of $485,978 as compared to profits of $1,970,888 for units with higher SBI levels (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; values of 4.34 and above). In other words, units that had strong SBIs tended to be more than 4 times more profitable than units with weaker SBIs. These findings highlight the financial benefits of creating positive SBI in the minds of customers, as well as the importance of controlling employee turnover, and improving customer orientation and service delivery levels. Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions One of the key strengths of this study is the use of a data set with time-lagged measures. Recently, Roe (2008) found that less than 10% of all studies published in applied psychology journals incorporated time into their theoretical framework and that fewer than 6% actually tested the temporal aspects of theorized relationships. Specific to the domain of collective turnover, 72% of studies examine it using a 1-year window. Given that proper understanding of the cause-effect timing is critical to detecting causal relationships (Mitchell and James 2001), we believe the focus on the multiyear process is critical. This study has additional methodological strengths including the control of common source variance through the use of multiple data sources and the statistical control of extraneous variables (e.g., unit size, unemployment rates) that could affect key relationships.

Firm productivity is key to poverty reduction – takes out unemployment arguments because employment in unproductive can never solve. Hull[[17]](#footnote-17)

Second, is employment-intensive or productivity-intensive growth more important for poverty reduction? This will depend on the quality (or productivity) of jobs in the sector in which growth occurs. Put simply, for employment-intensive growth to translate into poverty reduction it must occur in a “more productive” sector, while “less productive” sectors may require productivity-intensive growth to ensure a decline in headcount poverty. The first two steps of the framework in Part III provide tools for profiling growth (according to its employment- and productivity-intensity) and assessing its impact on poverty

Contention 3 is Impact Framing

**Subpoint A** - Prefer highly probably, systematic impacts

**First** - Magnitude: Lack of credible specific brink on extinction scenarios means that we don’t know when the neg impacts will occur but the aff impact aggregates every day, meaning the magnitude will be greater by the time your scenario occurs.

**Second** –time frame - Poverty occurs daily whereas DA’s go through a serious of steps. New political, technological, economic, and environmental developments can drastically change the probability of your link chain, but there are no comparable variables that will likely change the probability and impact of structural violence.

**Third** - Probability - Prefer high probability impacts to prevent policy inaction—otherwise policy will focus on magnitude and not address every-day issues that affect millions. And, given that there are multiple big impacts scenarios we don’t know which to prevent first.

**Fourth** – scenario predictions are inaccurate. Link chains based off predictions of various others are inherently inaccurate and poor decision metrics. **Menand[[18]](#footnote-18) 05** explains the Tetlock study:

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley [psychologist] —and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years [study] ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the **experts had made 82**,361 **[thousand] forecasts.** Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, **the experts performed worse than** they would have **if they had** simply **assigned** an **equal** probability to all three outcomes—if they had given **each** possible **future** a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

**Subpoint B** - Prefer empirics specific to municipal living wages over minimum wage generics

**First**, the living and minimum wage are distinct policies and require independent empirical analysis. **Neumark and Adams[[19]](#footnote-19) 2:**

Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

**Second**, living wages uniquely avoid employment harms – cities can absorb cost increases. **Clain[[20]](#footnote-20) 07**

In the case of living wage legislation, coverage is much narrower. The employers of the low-wage workers targeted by the legislation are typically selling services to local governments. To the extent that their “customers” (the local governments) willfully and intentionally commit themselves to maintaining their demand and absorbing the higher costs for such services, there could well be no disemployment effects. The redistribution of income caused by the legislation could well be from taxpayers in general to low-wage workers in particular. I find some evidence that this redistribution does occur

**Third**, minimum wage literature is biased and ignores the success of living wages. **Maloney[[21]](#footnote-21) 13**

One of the most surprising results from the U.S. literature is that there is evidence that living wage laws have the intended effects in reducing poverty rates. This finding has often been ignored in surveys of this U.S. literature, and is striking because it runs counter to the consensus in the minimum wage literature of extremely small if any associated anti-poverty effects. Neumark and Adams found fairly consistent evidence that employer-assistance living wage policies lead to small reductions in overall city poverty rates. Clain (2008) using an entirely different data source confirmed this general result, by finding that county-level poverty rates declined “modestly” with the introduction of a living wage ordinance in the area.

Alternate Contention

Contention 1 is poverty

Poverty is on the rise despite job growth. Income inequality and low pay are the root causes**. Fletcher[[22]](#footnote-22) 13**

Nearly a third of the nation’s working families earn salaries so low that they struggle to pay for their necessities, according to a new report. The ranks of the so-called working poor have grown even as the nation has created new jobs for 27 consecutive months and is showing other signs of shaking off the worst effects of the recession. “Although many people are returning to work, they are often taking jobs with lower wages and less job security, compared with the middle class jobs they held before the downturn,” according to a report released Tuesday by the Working Poor Families Project, a national initiative aimed at fostering state policies to help low-income working families. With the nation’s economy in recovery, the report said, more than 70 percent of low-income families and half of all poor families were working by 2011. The problem is they did not earn enough to cover their basic living expenses. “We’re not on a good trajectory,” said Brandon Roberts, who manages the Working Poor Families Project. “The overall number of low-income working families is increasing despite the recovery.” Analyzing 2011 data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, the report said that 32 percent of working families earned salaries that put them below double the poverty threshold. For a family of four, double the poverty threshold was $45,622. That percentage has crept up from 28 percent in 2007, the year the recession began. And 37 percent of the nation’s children — 23.5 million — were part of working poor families in 2011, the report said, up from 33 percent in 2007. Nearly three in five low-income working families were headed by at least one minority parent, even though minorities headed 42 percent of all working families. The growth in the ranks of the working poor coincides with continued growth in income inequality. Many of the occupations experiencing the fastest job growth during the recovery also pay poorly. Among them are retail jobs, food preparation, clerical work and customer assistance. At the same time, researchers have found that many jobs that do not require much in the way of educational credentials but pay relatively well have lagged in the recovery. They include carpenters, painters, real estate brokers and insurance professionals. Jobs typically filled by college graduates fared better than others during the downturn, helping to widen the gap between those at the top of the wage scale and those at the bottom. In 2011, the top fifth of working families had incomes that were 10.1 times greater than those in the bottom fifth of income earners. In 2007, the top fifth of working families earned 9.5 times those in the lowest fifth. Meanwhile, the best means for climbing the income ladder — improved education — is growing more uncertain and more expensive, the report said. Also, the federal government is facing huge budget deficits, meaning that policies that would help bolster working poor families, such as a higher minimum wage, are unlikely to be implemented. Still, Roberts said, “we have to be more aggressive” with policy. “We’re not talking about all families. We’re talking about families

And low pay work can’t raise people out of poverty – wage increases are necessary solve poverty and inequality in the status quo. **Page[[23]](#footnote-23) 14**

Wage adequacy: Even if a low-skill job is acquired, it won’t be poverty-reducing unless it delivers enough in the way of wages (or transfers) to push the recipient over the poverty threshold.4 Over the last 40 years, the wages of low-skill jobs have been stagnant for a number of reasons, including, for example, the declining real value of the minimum wage. Between 1975 and 1995, the 20th percentile of the weekly wage distribution declined from $473 to $386, resulting in fewer jobs that provided an above-poverty wage. Recent studies have shown that a $100 reduction in the real weekly wage among workers in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution reduces the annual probability of escaping poverty by about 15 percent.5 The declining payoff to work could also reduce the incentive to work at all, which may in turn lead to a deterioration of skills, further reducing the likelihood of escaping poverty

The net effect of the living wage is reduction in poverty – prefer my evidence because it accounts for a risk of unemployment. **CRA[[24]](#footnote-24) 11**, bracketed

[living wages] Reduce the fraction of households below the federal poverty line by between 2.4 and 4.1 percentage points, or between 0.9 and 1.6 percentage points based on a 38% increase above the minimum wage. The empirical evidence shows that the estimated size of the change varies across samples and time periods and in some cases it is not statistically different from zero. Some of the workers receiving wage gains are in households that were below the Federal poverty line before the enactment of the mandates and above the poverty line after the enactment of the mandates. Our interpretation for the reduction in poverty is that some households may have moved from just below the poverty line to just above the poverty line. While some households found themselves above the poverty line, other households may have moved to just below the poverty line or moved into further poverty due to lower employment [resulted] resulting from the enactment of the wage mandates. But the net effect may suggest reductions in poverty

Prefer CRA 11

1. Lit review – the CRA research conducted a literature review taking into account all the best studies on living wages. Lit review preferable because they demonstrate robustness by solving for any methodology issues within individual studies.
2. Prefer experts on economics since the data trumps intuition and analytics – we would need a phd in economics to truly gauge the quality of the research – our analytics are bs compared to their conclusions. **CRA 2** furthers:

There is **a critical point in the discussion of** why **living wages** may or may not help poor and low-income families that **bears emphasizing**. Note that **economic theory** **predicts** that **a** mandated wage floor – whether a **living wage** or a minimum wage – **will reduce employment**. **However**, **how** **a** mandated **wage floor affects** **the distribution of income, and poor families** in particular, **is purely an empirical question**. One can be absolutely convinced, from the theory or, preferably, the evidence, that living wages (or minimum wages) reduce employment. But this provides no reason to believe on a priori grounds that a living wage would fail to help poor families. The existence of job losses is perfectly compatible with living wages doing more for poor families via the wage increases that some workers get than the job losses that others experience. **There** **is**, in other words, **no logical conclusion** stemming **from standard economic theory** **to the conclusion** **that** **living wages** (or minimum wages) **could not help the** **poor**. **The latter question** **is** a **purely empirical** one.

1. Time frame & methodology – the CRA research includes the most data – means its most likely to account for extraneous variables and smooths out for macroeconomic trends like expansions and recessions. Also, the first municipality living wage introduced in 1994 so more recent studies have had improvements in economic models – **CRA 3** furthers:

**Comprehensive reviews of the research literature through 2003 were provided in Adams and Neumark** (2004a and 2004b). These reviews summarize the evidence from previous studies by these two authors (Neumark, 2004; Neumark and Adams, 2003a and 2003b; Adams and Neumark, 2005a and 2005b), but also provide a review and critique of other research on the impact of living wages. Holzer (2008) reviewed the living wage literature more recently, although this review focuses almost entirely on the same research extending through 2005, as there was little additional research done since.

To a large extent, these reviews focused on studies of the actual effects of living wage laws implemented in US cities, based on “before-and-after” comparisons of labor market outcomes in cities that implemented living wage laws and cities that did not. That is, **these reviews largely ignore an earlier wave of “impact” studies that** tried to **assess the consequences of living wage laws before they were implemented in cities**.1 Typically, these were reports prepared for municipal governments contemplating the adoption of living wages, usually by academics advocating for or against living wages, or on behalf of advocacy organizations. Many of the versions of such studies done by living wage advocates were recently published in Pollin et al. (2008). Pollin and many of his co-authors are or were associated with the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, which focuses, among other things, on using living wage initiatives to help reverse rising wage inequality and declining living standards for low-wage workers.2 Examples on the other side of the debate include Sander et al. (2002), later published as Sander and Williams (2005); Tolley et al. (1999); and Yelowitz and Toikka (2005). These studies were published by the Employment Policies Institute, which generally opposes wage floors.3 These impact studies largely reflect educated guesses. At their core, such studies combine two things: data describing the labor market in the city in which a living wage is being contemplated, and assumptions about the behavioral responses of firms and workers to the proposed living wage. The effects of the living wage are then “simulated” by applying the assumed behavioral responses to the existing data. Obviously, the answers depend strongly on the assumptions that are made – most importantly, but not exclusively, on the assumptions that are made about the employment response to the higher wage mandated by the living wage law. From a research perspective that tries to draw general conclusions about the effects of living wages, they are far less compelling than more sound social scientific methods of policy evaluation based on treatment and comparison groups.4 However, these impact studies can be useful in helping city governments (and others assessing city policies) to develop some understanding of how living wages might impact the jurisdictions with which they are concerned – especially when there are unique aspects of the living wage law under consideration, the particular city and policies in which the living wage might be imposed, or both. Such is the case for the proposed New York City living wage that this report addresses, and as a consequence, our report does rely in part on an impact analysis. **The combination of the two types of analyses – impact studies, and before-and-after analyses – is key**. In particular, rather than using assumed behavioral responses that can fully determine the conclusions of an impact study, a before-and-after analysis of other cities is used to estimate these behavioral responses. Some of the estimated behavioral responses are then applied in the impact analysis. We think that the impact (or “simulation”) analysis for New York is particularly important because, arguably, the before-and-after evidence is less applicable to New York City because it is such a large, complex, and, in many ways, unique labor market. Nonetheless, one needs to make assumptions about behavioral responses for the impact analysis, and it seems best to tie these, where possible, to estimates from observed changes in behavior. Given that this report, to some extent, relies on the “impact study” approach as well as before-and-after analyses, the review of the literature expands beyond the earlier reviews to provide some discussion of previous impact studies. **Finally**, **there is** a small amount of **new research** on living wages that was **not covered in** the **earlier reviews**. There was a quite comprehensive study of the Los Angeles living wage (Fairris et al., 2005, many of the key results of which are in Fairris [2005] and Fairris and Bujunda [2008]), and a recent study of the effects of living wage laws in California (Lester, forthcoming) and nationally (Lester and Jacobs, 2010). **This work is** **also** summarized and **reviewed**.In addition to this research on labor market impacts, there is a much smaller set of papers that tries to assess how living wage laws impact public benefits. Because living wage laws may affect labor incomes, they can also have implications for eligibility for different government programs. This, in turn, can affect both the resources available to families, as well as the expenditures of local or state governments of various kinds of government benefits, and the flow of federal benefit dollars into the locality adopting a living wage. The studies in this vein include Shaviro (1999) and Toikka et al. (2005).5 This section of the report provides an up-to-date review of the research literature. It draws on the previous reviews, and also synthesizes the new studies into this review. The goal is to provide a thorough discussion and assessment of all of the research on living wages, including critiques of various parts of this research literature by all parties. The discussion is, however, more detailed with regard to the type of empirical analysis that we use in this report – in particular, the “before-and-after” analysis of a large number of US cities that implemented living wage laws, which is used in the work by Neumark and Adams. As explained below, this panel data approach provides a realistic way to draw conclusions from the experience of all major cities that have implemented living wage laws, in a manner that allows a researcher to study a large number of outcomes of interest (wages, employment, family income, receipt of government benefits, etc.).6 As explained earlier, the results from this approach are central to any impact study, because the estimated behavioral responses drive the conclusions of the impact study.

And no harm to employment – the best empirics show slight employment gains. **Lester and Jacobs[[25]](#footnote-25) 10:**

The study examines how living wage standards affect 14 distinct employment variables: total citywide; broad low-wage services; narrow low-wage services; retail; restaurants; hotels; manufacturing; nondurable manufacturing; back-office; wholesale; big-box retail; finance insurance and real estate; headquarters; and branch plants. Together these provide a comprehensive examination of the potential combined direct, direct spillover, and indirect effects that business assistance living wage laws can have on local employment. Figure 1 presents these 14 variables as the possible range of employment change expected after passage, allowing up to two years for lagged effects. None of the 14 outcome variables show a statistically significant negative consequence of passing a business assistance living wage standard. Statistically significant outcomes would mean that we are 90 percent confident that the estimate is different from zero. But this is not the case for any of the variables, which means we can conclude that there is no employment effect. (More detailed results are presented in the technical appendix.)41 Our estimates indicate that passage of a business assistance living wage law has no measurable effect on citywide employment. Employment levels are unaffected in low-wage industries as is employment in industries likely to be targets of economic development subsidies and in firms that are sensitive to the perceived business climate of a city. This suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have direct, direct spillover, or indirect effects on employment levels. These findings discredit the primary arguments used by opponents of business assistance living wage laws that these laws are harmful to employment in direct and indirect ways. It is important to note that the results are based on nearly 20 years of data—a timeframe that contained years of recessions and expansions—which suggests that business assistance living wage laws are unlikely to have an effect on employment levels even during hard economic times. Main findings Main findings | www.americanprogressaction.org 25 These results are also quite robust. For example, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular city from the treatment group has no meaningful effect on the results. Figure 1 visually represents the 90 percent confidence interval of our point estimates. Any number line in Figure 1 that includes zero in the shaded area indicates that the estimated effect is not different than zero. This means that there is no estimated employment effect, which is the case for all the variables tested. The estimated impact of employment in low-wage industries—the sectors where we can expect the living wage to have the largest bite—bears some additional discussion. Our estimates for the five low-wage sectors we measure are all nearly zero, or slightly positive. These results strongly contrast with the findings of Adams and Neumark, who find significant negative employment effects for low-wage workers overall. For retail and restaurants our estimates are precise enough to reject the point estimates of their study.42

Aff disproportionately helps disadvantaged groups – **Niedt**[[26]](#footnote-26) writes

The unequal distribution of racial groups among these occupations suggests a racially segmented labor market within these occupational categories. To test for the statistical significance of this unequal distribution, we compared these observed counts against the number expected for each occupational category if people of different racial groups were evenly distributed across them. In other words, we would expect the proportion of janitors who are African American to be roughly equal to their share of the total population of low-wage service workers. By this test, African Americans are overrepresented in the following occupational categories: janitors, guards, and construction workers. A chi square test indicates that these disparities are statistically significant, meaning that they cannot be attributed to chance. The gender distribution of low-wage workers is similarly uneven and beyond what would be expected if chance were the only factor in determining the distribution.13 Women constitute 49% of this population, but, as shown in Table 3, they account for 83% of administrative support workers and 84% of the personal services category: attendants, guides, child care providers, public transportation attendants, etc. Conversely, construction and other “laborer” categories, security guards, and transportation are primarily a male domain.

Impact is poverty which is a direct link into structural violence, Abu-Jamal**[[27]](#footnote-27)** bracketed

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --Ghandi It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

Contention 2 is worker turnover

Literature consensus proves that living wages reduce turnover, and cause boosts in productivity. **Thompson and Chapman[[28]](#footnote-28) 06 bracketed**

One potential benefit of living wage ordinances (which is also one explanation for the minor impact on municipal budgets and employment levels) is that higher wage floors lead to decreased turnover and greater work effort among the affected workforce, as well as spur firms to seek out and adopt other means of boosting productivity. These responses could offset at least some of the increased labor costs experienced by employers. Most of the available research on living wages suggests that these types of responses are occurring. 15 Increased productivity resulting from wage increases has been recognized for decades, particularly in the economics literature on “efficiency wages” and debates over the minimum wage. With higher wages, workers may feel greater satisfaction with their job and may decide to put in greater work effort.27 Increased effort could also result from fear of losing the job; now that the job is more desirable than available alternatives the “cost of job loss” is greater. A related byproduct is that workers may be less likely to leave their jobs, thus lowering the rate of employee turnover and reducing costs of recruiting and training new workers. All of these mechanisms suggest ways that increased labor costs for firms are offset. The research on the living wage has provided new opportunities to test for evidence of these effects. The earliest living wage studies relied on qualitative interviews, and presented evidence to suggest that employees were working harder with the new wage floor and turnover had declined. In their survey of affected workers, Niedt found that most reported an improved attitude toward their job, including a greater sense of worth of the job and an intention to stay on the job longer (Niedt 1999, 2). Similarly, in their interviews with effected contractors, researchers at Preamble found evidence suggesting improved attitudes toward work as well as reduced turnover (Preamble 1996, 13). The Preamble study quotes one manager as saying “workers seem happy [and] they come to work on time because they know that at $6.10 [in 1995] per hour, somebody else wants the job if they don’t.” Further anecdotal evidence of decreased turnover following living wage ordinances is reported in Elmore’s survey of cities. Sander and Lokey’s interviews with contractors following implementation of the living wage ordinance in Los Angeles also yielded evidence that some firms had responded to increased labor costs by becoming more productive. At SFO, Reich found evidence that the living wage led to increased productivity, reduced turnover, and shorter airport lines. There were 1,550 fewer turnovers per year at SFO following implementation of the QSP (Reich 2003, 55). Security screeners, who had a notoriously high turnover rate of 94.7% before the living wage, had just [and] an 18.7% turnover rate after the living wage, where the average wage of security screeners went from $6.45 an hour to $10.00 an hour. Annual turnover among firms experiencing “high impacts” from the QSP fell from 49% to 20%, while turnover at “low impact” firms fell from 17% to 14% (Reich 2003, 52).28 In addition, employers reported a range of other positive outcomes following the implementation of the QSP: 35% reported improvement in work performance, 47% reported better employee morale, 44% reported fewer disciplinary issues, and 45% reported improved customer service.29 David Fairris’ study of Los Angeles found that employers in that city also reaped some benefits from the living wage. While employee turnover decreased for the entire sample of firms, it appears that firms affected by the living wage experienced larger decreases than firms that were not affected. Differences in the questionnaires for the two types of firms complicate the analysis, but Fairris reported significantly lower levels of turnover at affected firms. Controlling for other factors, Fairris showed one-third less turnover among low-wage workers in firms affected by the living wage ordinance (Fairris 2005, 101). This conclusion holds when looking at the entire firm and focusing exclusively on turnover among the lowest-paid workers. Based on his regression analysis, Fairris concludes, “The lower turnover rate 16 for prominent low-wage occupations in living wage establishments is entirely accounted for by the higher wage that prevails there.” Additionally, absenteeism declined more at low-wage firms affected by the ordinance than at low-wage firms not impacted by the ordinance. The detailed interviews with firms affected by Los Angeles’s living wage ordinance buttress the statistical results. The LAANE study quotes one employer as stating, “Higher wages mean less turnover” (Fairria et al. 2005). One in-depth analysis of living wage ordinances’ impact on turnover was conducted by Candace Howes, an economist at Connecticut College. Howes studied the impact of a series of living wage policies, which nearly doubled the hourly wages of homecare workers in San Francisco, and provided them with health insurance. Using a unique database linking payroll records with case management files, Howes found that homecare worker turnover fell by 57% following the implementation of the living wage policies30 (Howes 2005, 140). The likelihood that a new worker would stay at least one year on the job rose by 89%, after controlling for the effects of general economic growth. Most studies looking at the topic of turnover, absenteeism, and employee work effort have found some evidence supporting the beneficial impacts of living wages. One study reporting mixed findings is Brenner’s analysis of Boston. Although one quarter of firms reported greater employee work effort and one quarter similarly reported improved morale, there was no evidence that higher wages produced lower turnover or less absenteeism (Brenner 2005, 73-77).

And low turnover is key to firm productivity and growth – it makes profits four times greater. **Holtom[[29]](#footnote-29) 12 bracketed**

We proposed and tested an integrated model of unit-level attrition, customer-related outcomes, and profit within the context of a relationship-based service business. Using time-lagged data, we demonstrated the negative effect voluntary turnover has on CESD [customer evaluation of service delivery] and their subsequent impact on [service brand image] SBI. Downsizing was shown to have a negative impact on customer orientation, which also influences SBI. We did not find a negative relationship between downsizing and CESD. Finally, we observed a strong relationship between service-brand image and profits. In short, the data confirm that high levels of attrition—whether through downsizing or voluntary turnover—have a negative impact on customers’ image of the service brand, which predict subsequent declines in unit profitability. Theoretical Implications The results of our analyses suggest that employee attrition has significant negative effects on the performance of business units. In addition, by demonstrating that CESD fully mediates the relationship between voluntary turnover and SBI and that customer orientation fully mediates the relationship between downsizing and SBI, we have taken an initial step in clarifying the contents of the ‘‘black box’’ between turnover and its performance-related consequences (Hausknecht and Trevor 2011; Holtom et al. 2008). These findings and the underlying theoretical mechanisms are likely to extend to contexts where customers interact with the same employee more than once, and where an understanding of a customer’s idiosyncratic needs is critical in order to provide high service levels. These contexts include many personal service settings (e.g., financial services, health care, child care) as well business-to-business relationships (e.g., industrial suppliers, professional service firms). Additionally, as Hausknecht and Trevor (2011, p. 355) noted, ‘‘involuntary turnover dynamics are not well understood.’’ This fact coupled with the pervasiveness of reductions in force or downsizing in the United States (U.S. Department of Labor 2010) point to the importance of these empirical results. Not only is the financial impact made clear but also insights into the process by which it occurs are illuminated. Contrary to our prediction and the findings of McElroy and associates (2001), downsizing was not found to negatively influence CESD. While the reason for this finding is not completely clear, it is possible that the downsizing units in our sample were able to prevent short-term disruption to their operations by a more efficient use of their remaining employees. However, it should be noted that downsizing did have a significant negative influence on employees’ customer orientation levels, which is likely to translate into lower CESD levels in the long term. Implications for Practice The organizational behavior literature is rich with theory and associated practical recommendations for organizations desiring to reduce voluntary turnover. For many years, researchers have advocated increasing JS (Hackman and Oldham 1978) or organizational commitment (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982) as methods for stemming turnover. More recently, perceived organizational support (Eisenberger et al. 1986) and job embeddedness (Mitchell et al. 2001) have gained traction as theories with strong empirical support and rich recommendations for combating high levels of voluntary turnover. For example, in addition to looking at the fit an employee has with the organization, the links he or she has developed with people inside the organization and the sacrifices that would be incurred if he or she were to leave, job embeddedness looks at a person’s fit with, links in and benefits associated with the community where he or she lives (Mitchell et al. 2001). This gives the manager multiple ports for influencing employee connections to the job and surrounding area, thereby increasing the probability of staying. Though relatively less is known about the effects of downsizing, both the decision and the process by which it occurs are controlled directly by managers. Thus, the primary practical implication of this work as it relates to downsizing is to be cognizant of its potential impact. Similar to the delay in observing the positive effect from marketing actions or service enhancements designed to improve satisfaction (van Doorn 2008), the negative effects of downsizing are most likely to be delayed. Thus, while there are obvious financial savings from planned attrition, there may be material long-term financial implications from downsizing that managers may not predict. However, these hidden costs from downsizing and turnover may be significant and therefore important for managers to anticipate. There are a number of ways that these effects might be mitigated by addressing the mediators of the relationship with SBI directly. Specifically, the leader of a unit experiencing high rates of voluntary turnover would be well advised to reemphasize to remaining employees the importance of communicating effectively with clients to provide personalized service in order to maintain positive CESD. Similarly, knowing that downsizing affects perceptions of customer orientation, organizations that opt to downsize can try to reduce this impact by developing specific training for remaining employees that emphasizes listening to clients, partnering with them to develop effective responses in a timely manner, and ensuring that a consistent understanding of what constitutes positive service delivery exists. Our results also highlight the importance of emphasizing customer orientation among employees. High levels of customer orientation can be obtained by selection customerfocused employees, training them in customer-related attitudes and skills, and rewarding them for customer-oriented behaviors like responsiveness, helpfulness, and relationship building (Schneider and Bowen 1995). Further, notwithstanding evidence that time-lagged relationships reported are generally weaker than concurrent relationships, we found strong support for the mediating role of CESD in creating positive SBI and profits. Because this variable was measured using data directly from customers, we believe that the role employee continuity plays in maintaining functional relationships between the organization and its customers cannot be ignored. While the direct costs of voluntary turnover are well known (e.g., recruitment, testing, selection, training), this research adds insight into the indirect costs of attrition on profitability. In order to demonstrate the practical implications of this study, we estimated the differences in CESD and customer orientation rates for high and low attrition units as well as the profitability of units with high and low SBIs. We found that units that had high levels of voluntary turnover (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or above 42%) had an average CESD score of 3.94, while those with low voluntary turnover rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; voluntary turnover rates at or below 20%) had an average CESD score of 4.19—a significant quarter scale point difference. Similarly, units that engaged in high levels of downsizing (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; downsizing rates at or above 19%) had an average customer orientation score of 3.93, while the units with low downsizing rates (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; downsizing rates at or below 8%) had an average customer orientation score of 4.38—a significant difference of almost a half scale point. More interestingly, units with lower levels of SBI (i.e., at or below the 20th percentile; values of 4.12 and below) had unit profits of $485,978 as compared to profits of $1,970,888 for units with higher SBI levels (i.e., at or above the 80th percentile; values of 4.34 and above). In other words, units that had strong SBIs tended to be more than 4 times more profitable than units with weaker SBIs. These findings highlight the financial benefits of creating positive SBI in the minds of customers, as well as the importance of controlling employee turnover, and improving customer orientation and service delivery levels. Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions One of the key strengths of this study is the use of a data set with time-lagged measures. Recently, Roe (2008) found that less than 10% of all studies published in applied psychology journals incorporated time into their theoretical framework and that fewer than 6% actually tested the temporal aspects of theorized relationships. Specific to the domain of collective turnover, 72% of studies examine it using a 1-year window. Given that proper understanding of the cause-effect timing is critical to detecting causal relationships (Mitchell and James 2001), we believe the focus on the multiyear process is critical. This study has additional methodological strengths including the control of common source variance through the use of multiple data sources and the statistical control of extraneous variables (e.g., unit size, unemployment rates) that could affect key relationships.

Firm productivity is key to poverty reduction – takes out unemployment arguments because employment in unproductive can never solve. Hull[[30]](#footnote-30)

Second, is employment-intensive or productivity-intensive growth more important for poverty reduction? This will depend on the quality (or productivity) of jobs in the sector in which growth occurs. Put simply, for employment-intensive growth to translate into poverty reduction it must occur in a “more productive” sector, while “less productive” sectors may require productivity-intensive growth to ensure a decline in headcount poverty. The first two steps of the framework in Part III provide tools for profiling growth (according to its employment- and productivity-intensity) and assessing its impact on poverty

Contention 3 is Impact Framing

**Subpoint A** - Prefer highly probably, systematic impacts

**First** - Magnitude: Lack of credible specific brink on extinction scenarios means that we don’t know when the neg impacts will occur but the aff impact aggregates every day, meaning the magnitude will be greater by the time your scenario occurs.

**Second** –time frame - Poverty occurs daily whereas DA’s go through a serious of steps. New political, technological, economic, and environmental developments can drastically change the probability of your link chain, but there are no comparable variables that will likely change the probability and impact of structural violence.

**Third** - Probability - Prefer high probability impacts to prevent policy inaction—otherwise policy will focus on magnitude and not address every-day issues that affect millions. And, given that there are multiple big impacts scenarios we don’t know which to prevent first.

**Fourth** – scenario predictions are inaccurate. Link chains based off predictions of various others are inherently inaccurate and poor decision metrics. **Menand[[31]](#footnote-31) 05** bracketed

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley [psychologist] —and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years [study] ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the **experts had made 82**,361 **[thousand] forecasts.** Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, **the experts performed worse than** they would have **if they had** simply **assigned** an **equal** probability to all three outcomes—if they had given **each** possible **future** a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

**Subpoint B** - Prefer empirics specific to municipal living wages over minimum wage generics

**First**, the living and minimum wage are distinct policies and require independent empirical analysis. **Neumark and Adams[[32]](#footnote-32) 2:**

Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

**Second**, living wages uniquely avoid employment harms – cities can absorb cost increases. **Clain[[33]](#footnote-33) 07**

In the case of living wage legislation, coverage is much narrower. The employers of the low-wage workers targeted by the legislation are typically selling services to local governments. To the extent that their “customers” (the local governments) willfully and intentionally commit themselves to maintaining their demand and absorbing the higher costs for such services, there could well be no disemployment effects. The redistribution of income caused by the legislation could well be from taxpayers in general to low-wage workers in particular. I find some evidence that this redistribution does occur

**Third**, minimum wage literature is biased and ignores the success of living wages. **Maloney[[34]](#footnote-34) 13**

One of the most surprising results from the U.S. literature is that there is evidence that living wage laws have the intended effects in reducing poverty rates. This finding has often been ignored in surveys of this U.S. literature, and is striking because it runs counter to the consensus in the minimum wage literature of extremely small if any associated anti-poverty effects. Neumark and Adams found fairly consistent evidence that employer-assistance living wage policies lead to small reductions in overall city poverty rates. Clain (2008) using an entirely different data source confirmed this general result, by finding that county-level poverty rates declined “modestly” with the introduction of a living wage ordinance in the area.

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